ISM-2149: Allow Only Approved Remote Access Tools

Reviewed by Greg Tereszczyn on 8 November 2026 against ISM 2026.09.4

Patch, the TERESEC cat mascot, checking two tagged remote controls against a short list and dropping an untagged one in a bin: ISM-2149, a list of authorised RMM and remote access tools is developed, enforced and maintained

A list of authorised RMM tools and remote access tools is developed, enforced and maintained.

ISM-2149, Information Security Manual, Australian Signals Directorate. ISM text © Commonwealth of Australia, CC BY 4.0, via cyber.gov.au.

Where it sits
Guidelines for system management › System administration › Administrative tools
Applies to
Non-classified, OFFICIAL: Sensitive, PROTECTED, SECRET, TOP SECRET
Essential Eight
Not an Essential Eight requirement
ASD revision
Revision 0, September 2026. Checked against ISM 2026.09.4.

Decide which tools are allowed

List each RMM and remote access tool with its owner, its purpose and the account or server it connects to, your IT provider's tools included.

Stop everything else

Use application control so unlisted tools cannot start, and block their network connections at the gateway (ISM-2150).

Keep the list current

Update it whenever a tool or provider changes, review it at least once a year, and keep watching the tools you approved.

On this page

ISM-2149 says an organisation keeps a list of the remote monitoring and management (RMM) and remote access tools it has authorised, enforces that list, and keeps it up to date. Attackers use the same legitimate software IT teams use, and security products tend to let it through, so the list decides what may run. Its companion ISM-2150 blocks network connections for every other tool, and both are new in the September 2026 Information Security Manual.

#What does ISM-2149 require?

An RMM tool is, in the words of the United States' Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), "an agent that is installed on an endpoint to continuously monitor a machine or system's health and status, as well as enabling administration functions" (CISA). IT teams and managed service providers (MSPs) use these to patch and fix many computers at once. A remote access tool lets someone connect to a computer from elsewhere and see or control it.

ASD's glossary defines remote access as "Access to a system that originates from outside an organisation's network and enters the network through a gateway, including over the internet", and the control does not list the tools. Our reading: count anything that lets someone see or control a device from elsewhere, including an IT provider's RMM agent, remote support apps, remote desktop features in an operating system, browser-based remote desktops, tunnelling tools and virtual private network (VPN) clients.

ASD's section text gives the purpose: a list "to prevent the execution of those that are not authorised, to the extent possible", plus monitoring "for any unusual or unexpected network activity associated with their use". The statement has three parts:

  • Developed. Someone decides which tools are allowed and why. For application control, ASD says choosing by business need "is a more secure method than simply approving those already residing on a workstation or server".
  • Enforced. Our reading: a policy alone is not enforcement. Tools off the list are stopped from running. "To the extent possible" covers real limits, such as a device you do not manage; it does not make enforcement optional.
  • Maintained. ASD sets no interval. Our reading: update the list whenever a tool or provider changes, and review it at least once a year, matching ISM-1582's yearly check of application control rules.

ISM-2149 applies at every classification ASD marks, from non-classified systems to TOP SECRET, and is not part of the Essential Eight. The application control that enforces it is: ISM-0843 and ISM-1657 start at Maturity Level One.

#Why are legitimate remote tools a problem?

ASD gives the reason in the ISM: "Legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools and remote access tools are frequently abused by malicious actors as they are digitally signed, often permitted by application control rulesets and provide interactive access that blends with normal system administration activities."

An attacker using one often sets off no alarm. CISA and its US partners warn that "The use of RMM software generally does not trigger antivirus or antimalware defenses" (CISA). Removing administrator rights does not settle it either: "Because threat actors can download legitimate RMM software as self-contained, portable executables, they can bypass both administrative privilege requirements and software management control policies."

Getting a tool onto a device can take one phone call or chat. ASD's joint advisory says the Scattered Spider group "Posed as company IT and/or helpdesk staff to direct employees to run commercial remote access tools enabling initial access" (ASD). In September 2026 Microsoft described a campaign that "abuses Microsoft Teams external collaboration to impersonate IT or helpdesk personnel" (Microsoft). Red Canary says these tools "increasingly became the payload of choice among financially motivated attackers and ransomware affiliates in 2025" (Red Canary).

The tools you do allow are targets too. On 19 August 2026 ASD issued a high alert about attacks in Australia on flaws in an RMM platform used by MSPs and enterprise IT departments, and advised smaller businesses to ask their provider whether they used it. An organisation with a list already has that answer.

#What should be on the list?

A product name alone is not enough. For each tool, record:

  • what it is for, who owns it and who may use it
  • the account or server it connects to
  • for a provider's tool, the source addresses and time windows you approved (ISM-2124)
  • when it was last reviewed

The account or server matters because a copy an attacker sets up is still the same product. CISA found criminals running copies "configured to connect to the actor's RMM server". Our reading: say which instance is yours, because "this product is allowed" also lets theirs through.

Keep the list short. CISA's guide notes that "Often, threat actors leverage multiple RMM mechanisms at once", and with one tool per job an extra agent stands out. Check the operating system's own support tools too: Microsoft advises organisations using another remote support tool to "disable or remove Quick Assist as a best practice, if it isn't used within your environment" (Microsoft).

#How does it fit with the other controls?

ISM-2149 is the decision. Other controls do the work:

  • ISM-0843 and ISM-1657 put application control on workstations and restrict what runs "to an organisation-approved set". ASD says application control is aimed at malicious code but "can also prevent the installation or use of unapproved applications" (ASD).
  • ISM-1471 says publisher rules use both publisher names and product names. Our reading: even a correct rule may not tell your copy from an attacker's, so the gateway and monitoring have to catch that.
  • ISM-1073, ISM-2124 and ISM-2125 deal with service providers: access only under a contract, only through the tools, source addresses and time windows you approved, and logged by you where the provider cannot alter it. ASD says these limits apply "as additional safeguards rather than as substitutes" for measures such as multi-factor authentication (MFA). Our reading: the list is yours even when the provider runs the tool, and one document can serve both ISM-2149 and ISM-2124.

Our ISM-1593 guide covers attackers who call your service desk pretending to be staff. This control limits the damage when they call staff pretending to be the service desk.

#How do you meet ISM-2149?

  1. Find what is really there. Search the software inventory and network logs of every device you manage. CISA says: "Audit remote access tools on your network to identify currently used and/or authorized RMM software."
  2. Ask every provider and supplier which remote tools they use on your systems, from where and when.
  3. Decide and write it down. Keep one tool per job where you can, remove the rest, and share the list with whoever watches the logs.
  4. Enforce it on devices. Use application control so unlisted tools cannot start. CISA says: "Application controls should prevent both installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized RMM software."
  5. Block connections at the gateway (ISM-2150). Port rules alone will not do it: Microsoft says Quick Assist "communicates over port 443 (https)", the port ordinary web traffic uses. Our reading: filter by domain name, and add filtering that follows laptops off the office network.
  6. Harden the tools you keep. Patch them quickly, require MFA on their consoles, and give people only the access they need. ASD suggests "blocking MSP access by default and allowing remote access at an agreed time" (ASD).
  7. Watch what the list cannot stop. Alert on any new remote tool and on sessions outside agreed times. Red Canary says finding misuse of approved tools "is tricky and reliant on active monitoring, behavioral detection, and policy enforcement".
  8. Tell staff what real support looks like. Name the tool your IT team uses and how to check a call is genuine. Microsoft advises: "Never allow a connection to your device by someone claiming to be 'IT Support' unless you initiated the interaction with them."
  9. Test and review. Try to start an unlisted tool on a test device, which Red Canary calls "the most efficient way to test existing controls". Then review the list as above.

#What evidence shows ISM-2149 is met?

AskLook atGood looks like
Is there a list?The authorised tools listEvery entry has an owner, a reason, its account or server, and a review date
Does it match reality?Software inventory and a search for unlisted toolsNothing unlisted is installed or running, or each find has an open ticket
Are other tools stopped from running?Application control rules and block logs (ISM-0843, ISM-1657)A portable copy of an unlisted tool will not start
Are their connections blocked?Gateway and filtering rules, and block logs (ISM-2150)Unlisted tools cannot connect, on or off the office network
Do providers match it?Contracts and the approved record (ISM-1073, ISM-2124)Tools, source addresses and time windows are agreed in writing
Is provider access logged?Logs the provider cannot edit (ISM-2125)Someone reviews them and follows up unexpected sessions
Is the list current?Review dates and change ticketsReviewed in the last 12 months and after the latest change
Has it been tested?Test resultsStarting an unlisted tool was blocked and raised an alert

#What gets in the way?

Tools nobody counted. Red Canary says many security teams see unapproved RMM tools as "a symptom of 'shadow IT' and only a minimal cause for concern".

Suppliers with their own tool. A software vendor's support team may ask for a session on a tool you have not approved. Our reading: make it a recorded exception for one device and one job, and remove the tool afterwards.

Fear of breaking support. Run application control in audit mode first to see what it would block, then turn it on.

No application control yet. Start with the list and the gateway block, and work towards application control. A blocklist helps but will not finish the job: the open-source catalogue LOLRMM listed 262 RMM tools in October 2026 (LOLRMM).

Smaller and larger organisations. A smaller organisation can start with one email: ask the IT provider which tools they use and from where, keep the answer as the list, and ask them to block the rest and show you it works. A larger one has several teams, providers and acquired businesses, and needs inventory at scale and an approval process that is easier than working around it.

The business case. The cost is mostly time: the list, some rules and the odd exception, using application control that the Essential Eight already asks for. What it buys is closing a quiet way in that ASD warns about, and a fast answer when the next alert names a product.

#What tools and skills help?

  • Software inventory from an endpoint management or endpoint detection tool, to find what is installed and running.
  • Domain name filtering or a web gateway that can block remote tool domains, on and off the office network.
  • One remote support tool with named accounts, MFA and session logs, in place of several tools and shared logins.
  • Central logging with alerts on new remote tools and unexpected sessions.
  • Skills: someone who can write application control rules without breaking support and put approved tools and time windows into a provider's contract.

TERESEC is a NinjaOne partner, and NinjaOne sells an RMM platform. This guide does not recommend any RMM or remote access product.

Which of the products you already pay for help here? The free coverage check shows which ISM and Essential Eight controls your current products can reach, in about three minutes. To see ISM-2149 among the other controls, open it in our sample coverage report, or read what an ISM assessment involves.

#What changed in recent ISM releases?

ISM-2149 and ISM-2150 are new in the September 2026 release, at revision 0. ASD's change report says "A new security control was introduced recommending a list of authorised remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools and remote access tools be developed, enforced and maintained" (ASD). The same release added ISM-2124 and ISM-2125 on service provider access. Our ISM September 2026 summary covers the rest.

#Sources

Which of your licences already cover this?

The free coverage check shows which ISM and Essential Eight controls the products you already pay for can reach, in about three minutes. For a structured look at your own environment, an ISM assessment maps your controls and the evidence that proves them.

More ISM controls explained

Written by

Greg Tereszczyn

Greg Tereszczyn is the founder and principal consultant of TERESEC, an Australian cyber security consultancy for small and medium business. He turns the Essential Eight, the ISM, ISO/IEC 27001, NIST CSF and IEC 62443 into plain-English advice a business can act on.

Greg Tereszczyn on LinkedIn